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INTRODUCTION
In poor low-income nations economic growth constitutes the principal avenue for poverty reduction. Redistribution, even when feasible, can never be enough on its own to substantially reduce poverty. Thus, there is a close link between growth and poverty reduction. Growth, however, may result not just from policies that foster it such as trade policy reforms, but because certain nations have superior institutions within which the same policy framework is determined and executed. This also raises the issue of reverse causality. Higher incomes that are the result of growth in the context of well-functioning institutions, in turn also produce superior institutions that are a function of increased per-capita income. By institutions we imply factors that result in good governance: political stability, voice and accountability, the rule of law, the regulatory framework, bureaucratic quality and the control of corruption (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 2002 for example). There is little controversy over the important role played by both international trade and institutional quality in fostering growth. Economic development is, however, a complex phenomenon which encompasses a multitude of social, economic, political and scientific phenomenon.
Accounting for all of these factors in order to explain growth is a difficult task. The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the contribution of trade policy changes upon prosperity via its impact on per-capita income level differences across nations. Our paper contributes to the debate over the relative role of institutions versus trade integration (or policies) in determining relative levels of prosperity across countries. In this connection, some authors such as Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004, henceforth Rodrik et al.) claim that institutions dominate all other factors in determining income differences across countries; our analysis based on an extension of their very own framework is somewhat sceptical of this assertion. In addition, following Glaeser et al., (2004 a and b) we try to examine the role of human capital accumulation in this process, finding some support for their view that human capital can be just as important as institutional quality in determining relative prosperity, and may even lead to improved institutional functioning.
With regard to international trade and its impact on economic well-being, it has to be borne in mind that trade can increase or decrease independent of any violation of any of the indicators. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) , however, have convincingly argued that the Sachs and Warner (1995) study suffered from sample selection bias and that some openness indicators could be highly correlated with other indicators of good governance or institutional quality. As an example of the first problem, countries in sub-Saharan Africa failed to be counted as open as most of them had state monopolies controlling the export trade. This is not true because "open" economies as defined by Sachs and Warner (1995) such as Indonesia also had state monopolies in petroleum for example. Secondly, another indicator of the lack of openness, a black market premium on the exchange rate could be highly related to institutional quality (corruption, regulatory capacity). Most damaging of the Rodriguez and Rodrik critique of Sachs and Warner's assertion that openness promotes growth lies in the fact that an Africa dummy variable capturing the special effect of Africa on cross-national growth could be substituted for the two crucial openness indicators that contributed significantly to growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) went on to review some of the key crossnational empirical literature on the relationship between trade policy and economic growth and conclude that there is little evidence that open trade policies, in the sense of lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, are significantly associated with economic growth. The theory on this relationship, in the case of a small economy that takes world prices of tradable goods as given, would predict that: (1) in static models with no market imperfections and other pre-existing distortions, the effect of a trade restriction is to reduce the level of real GDP at world prices. In the presence of market failures such as externalities, trade restrictions may increase real GDP (although they are hardly ever the first-best means of doing so); (2) in standard models with exogenous technological change and diminishing returns to reproducible factors of production, a trade restriction has no effect on the long-run (steady-state). Dollar and Kraay (2002) have evaluated the role of institutions and international trade in economic development. They provide evidence that countries with better institutions and nations that trade more grow faster. However, they have concluded that it is trade which matters more in this nexus as a short term pro-growth strategy, institutions featuring more prominently in the long-run. But this conclusion is rejected by Rodrik et al. (2004) , who find that the quality of institutions 'trumps every thing else'. They conclude that when institutions are controlled for, the measures of integration have at best insignificant effects on the level of per-capita income. However, not all institutions matter equally. Democracy may not always contribute to growth, as has been the case in rapidly growing nations such as China and Singapore, see Barro (1996) . There is also the issue of human capital and its place in fostering growth, and even aiding the formation of superior institutions. Glaeser et al. (2004a) bring forth an important missing link to the debate by suggesting that human capital is more important for growth than are institutions. In fact, they go a step further by suggesting that human capital actually contributes to institutional improvement. Their paper presents the view point that the growth potential of developing countries depends more on the leadership qualities (good or bad dictatorships) rather than institutional quality.
On the importance of human capital vis-à-vis growth, Schiff (1999) , after reviewing recent empirical studies on the subject concludes that poor countries can only grow faster than rich countries if their initial stock of human capital exceeds the average level among other poor nations. For example, when East Asian and South Asian economies are compared, differences in human capital and differences in the convergence level seem to move together. For instance, East Asian Developing countries witnessed unprecedented increases in GNP per capita over the last three decades; 10 times for Malaysia, 65 times for Republic of Korea and 13 times for Thailand. During the same period, Asian least developed countries (Bhutan, Cambodia and Lao People's Democratic Republic) and South Asian developing countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) saw only a meagre increase in average income of between 2 and a little over 5 times.
It is intriguing to note that in 1960s when most of these countries were at similar stages of economic development, East Asian developing countries were far ahead of both Asian least developed countries and South Asian developing countries in human capital. In fact, the total literacy rates for East Asian developing countries in the 1960s were as high as 71 percent for the Republic of Korea, 68 percent for Thailand and even Malaysia had a rate of over 50 percent. On the other hand, in case of all Asian least developed countries and South Asian developing countries, the total literacy rates were as low as only 9 percent for Nepal and 15 percent for Pakistan, with Cambodia having 38 percent literacy.
After three decades, while Asian least developed countries and South Asian developing countries have some what augmented their human capital stocks, the total literacy rates are still far below 50 percent in the cases of Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. During the same period, however, East Asian developing countries have more or less achieved the formidable task of educating most of their people. As a result, in the late 1990s, the total literacy rate of the Republic of Korea had reached 98 percent, and Malaysia managed to achieve a rate of about 90 percent. In short, economic progress in East Asia during the 1980s may have occurred because of their well developed human capital endowment which gathered momentum in the 1960s or earlier. Figure 1 elaborates how the inter-relationship between growth, institutions, human capital and trade works. Any analysis, which attempts to capture the effects of institutions and openness on prosperity, is fraught with the problems of endogeneity and reverse causation. For example richer and more developed countries have better institutions and they are more liberalised with regard to trade than more underdeveloped nations. So a pertinent question can be raised as to whether affluent countries are rich because they are more open and have better institutions or does this relationship work in reverse? There is also a debate as to whether better institutions encourage trade, or if it is openness and liberalisation that cause institutional improvement. There is some evidence to suggest that both possibilities exist (see for example: Anderson and Mercuiller, 1999; and Wei, 2000) . "The extent to which an economy is integrated with the rest of the world and the quality of its institutions are both endogenous, shaped potentially not just by each other but also by income levels.
Problems of endogeneity and reverse causality plague any empirical researcher trying to make sense of relationship among these causal factors (Rodrik et al., 2004:2) ." Similarly human capital is also endogenous as it affects institutions as well as openness. Countries with higher levels of human capital are also the ones which have better institutions. Lipset (1960) suggests that high levels of human capital resulting from education leads to more benign politics, less violence and more political stability. Similarly, nations that grow faster have more resources at their disposal to improve human capital levels. Generally rich countries have a much higher level of human development than less developed countries. Furthermore, if more open economies are the countries that are more affluent, then not only growth but openness too may be the product of human capital formation. In the light of the above debate our model includes many of the core determinants of growth, namely international economic integration (including measures of openness and trade policy), measures of institutional quality, physical and human capital. In fact, our dependent variable is not growth per se, but the log of income per-capita, as in Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) .
Differences in per-capita income across countries are, of course, often a result of differential growth rates in the past. Here we follow the practice in Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) where the relative contribution of policies and institutions in explaining per-capita income differentials is tested. Our sample includes both rich OECD countries and developing countries. As regards "policy", we examine the effect of both openness, as in Rodrik et al. (2004) , as well as trade policy variables. Openness indicators are an outcome variable, pointing to the extent to which a country trades as a proportion of national income. Trade policy indicators are, however, a more direct measure of the policy stance, and this was not examined in Rodrik et al. (2004) . We deem these policy variables to be of greater significance in a test of the relative efficacy of policy vis-à-vis institutions.
The final equation to be estimated takes the following form:
The variable is income per capita in country i, , , Rodrik et al. (2004) only consider the rule of law. On the international economic integration front, we have carefully chosen three specific measures of openness. The ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the conventional openness indicator (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Rose, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004) . Two other measures of openness are overall trade penetration (tarshov) derived from World Bank's TARS system and overall import penetration (Impnov) respectively (see Rose, 2002) . Neither of these measures are direct indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only towards the level of its participation in international trade. There are indicators of trade restrictiveness acting as measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et al., 2001 , Rose 2002 .
Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and
capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import charges (Totimpov) can all be considered as good proxies for trade restrictiveness and have also been employed in our study. Other measures which capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff barriers. We use overall non-tariff coverage (Ntarfov) and non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owqi) as two proxies for non-tariff barriers (see Rose, 2002) . Moreover there is also a trend in the trade literature to use composite measures of trade policy. Edwards (1998) advocates the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (Open80), and Leamer's openness indicator (Leamer 82) as being apposite proxies of openness. We have also used these composite measures to examine in detail how openness influences per-capita income.
In summary our study employs 6 institutional and 11 openness variables in an attempt to undertake a comprehensive analysis of how institutional quality and exposure to increased international trade affects the economic performance of a country. Unlike in the comparable study by Rodrik et al. (2004) Before we undertake the regression analysis it is useful to explore the linear dynamics of the relationship between income and our selected determinants of economic prosperity or growth. On the other hand, the coefficients of our core trade policy variables show that a significant linear relationship is present between income and trade restrictiveness.
The table suggests that any decrease in tariffs and non-tariff barriers has a positive impact on per-capita income. Furthermore, institutions and human capital come out to be key determinants of economic wellbeing as nearly all of them are significantly related to income, see figure A1 and A2 (appendix 1). Only for specification 3 (see table 3 : appendix 2), which corresponds to the specification followed by Rodrik et al. (2004) , the results turn out to be similar to their study. Institutions clearly trump openness and trade policy as they have been highly significant in most cases. In contrast to institutional proxies, openness variables generally remained insignificant, and if significant have mostly entered equation 1 with a wrong sign. Trade policy variables also remained insignificant under specification 3 with the exception of trade taxes which are significant in some cases.
However, for specifications 1 and 2 (see table 3 taxes, which if lowered, contribute to growth. Esfhani (1991), however, provides contrary evidence. Similarly Lee (1995) found that there is a significant impact of imports on growth suggesting import taxes do matter in affecting growth. Thus in the context of a cross sectional study, it is wiser to examine the impact of overall trade taxes (import and export) instead of looking at any one of them in order to have a general insight into the workings of trade taxes apropos economic activity. According to Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) , overall trade taxes capture trade restrictiveness in a more complete manner than any of the other proxies of trade policy as it is comprised of both import and export taxes.
Not surprisingly, Txtrg (overall trade taxes) comes out to be the most important trade policy variable since it has been recorded as significant in many instances in all the 3 specifications(see table 4 : appendix 2). To be exact, Txtrdg is significant in 4 out of 6 cases in specification 1, 2 out of 6 cases in specification 2 and 2 out of 6 cases in specification 3. Note that trade taxes are most significant in (2002) share this scepticism over the relevance of these measures of trade policy with the likes of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Frankel and Romer (1999) There are many studies which have tried to capture the effects of trade policy on economic development: Sachs and Warner (1995) , Edwards (1998) and Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) are among the prominent studies which have employed direct proxies of trade policies. They confirm that the countries with policyinduced barriers to international trade grow at a slower pace. Notwithstanding the important role of these studies in providing useful insights into the 'trade and growth' debate, they have two shortcomings. First, in the light of recent evidence provided by Rodrik et al. (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2002) , their studies are likely to suffer from misspecification bias as they have not taken account of institutions in their growth equations. Secondly, they have assumed trade policy to be purely exogenous.
Wood (2004), commenting on the 'trade and growth' debate, not only emphasised that a more convincing basis for trade policy recommendations could only be provided if trade policy variables are included in the regressions, but also pointed out that any such attempt should consider trade policy as an endogenous concept as no trade policy recommendations can be given without taking second best effects into account. This is because trade policies crucially depend on the functioning of domestic markets of any particular country, and if these are imperfect, second best considerations enter the picture.
To this effect we have somewhat addressed the endogeneity of trade policy variables by regressing them on a set of instruments. Though the instruments remain very general in nature they do capture certain country specific characteristics. And as our per-capita income equation has institutional proxies and human capital along with trade policy variables, our analysis goes a step further from previous cross sectional studies which have attempted to gauge the effects of trade policy on economic development.
Although some of our trade policy variables are insignificant, we do get certain trade proxies which show that trade policy does matter in determining economic prosperity. The importance of any such cases is self evident because we not only dealt with trade policy as an endogenous concept but we have also included institutions and human capital in our per-capita income determining equation, so as to avoid the misspecification bias which cross section studies including the recent ones by Rodrik et al. (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2002) suffers from.
Overall, the results suggest that the general openness variables fail to explain per-capita income differences compared to direct proxies of the trade policy stance. Here the significance and correct signs of open80s reinforces the importance of the overall trade policy stance, informing us that even if tariffs and non-tariff barriers are unimportant at times, the composite trade policy package, especially taxes on exports and controls in the foreign exchange market can be crucial in explaining per-capita income differences across nations. The Sachs-Warner criteria defines country as open if (i) non-tariff barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade, (ii) average tariff rates are less than 40 percent, (iii) the black market premium was less than 20 percent during the 1980s, (iv) the economy is not socialist, and (v) the government does not control major exports through marketing boards. The rationale for combining these indicators into a single dichotomous variable is that they represent different ways in which policy makers can close their economy to international trade. However, according to the evidence provided by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) , the Sachs-Warner composite measure (open80) mainly derives its strength from the combination of black market premium and the state monopoly of exports. A state monopoly on major exports captures cases in which governments tax major exports and therefore reduce the level of trade (exports and imports), and the black market premium captures foreign exchange restrictions as a trade barrier.
Though Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) accepted state monopoly of exports as an appropriate proxy of trade restrictiveness, they felt that black market premia was not a good choice as it is highly correlated with inflation, the debt/export ratio, wars and institutional quality and may simply capture the effect of widespread macroeconomic and political crisis. Our IV regression analysis solves the problem of endogeneity of black market premia as we have regressed open80s with set of institutional and openness instruments. It may, therefore, be that both government monopoly over major exports and black market premia are robust proxies of trade restrictiveness.
Now we turn to institutions and their apparent role in economic development.
Specification 3 in table 3, which corresponds to the Rodrik et al. (2004) specification, supplements their assertion that institutional development is the key to economic development as our six institutional proxies have largely been significant when paired with any of the openness and trade policy variables under specification 3. But it would be interesting to know which institutional concepts matter more in explaining income differentials across countries? Table 5 shows that regulatory quality is the most important institutional definition in determining economic performance as it has one of the highest coefficients in nearly all instances. The superiority of regulatory quality is self evident because it captures the policy choices which dictate market outcomes. For example, it measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as protection of imports, control on foreign ownership, obstacles to foreign bidders on public contracts, real personal tax as a burden to enterprise, real corporate tax as a disincentive for entrepreneurship, the legal framework as an obstacle to competitiveness, customs as an impediment to international trade, price controls and competition laws as obstacles to competition. The key to development may lie in market friendly regulations through which the workings of financial and commercial institutions improve and adequate business development takes place amid increased competition. The importance of prudential regulation can be judged from the fact that many developing countries have done well, despite being run by autocratic states. China and South
Korea are the prime examples in this regard. Glaeser et al. (2004a Glaeser et al. ( , 2004b suggest that China, South Korea and Taiwan witnessed unprecedented increases in their growth rates under the reign of one-party dictatorships all due to the promotion of pro-market, pro growth policies, whereby property rights were secured and competition encouraged.
Regulatory quality is followed by government effectiveness as the most important institutional proxy. Again, this is expected because government effectiveness is very close to regulatory quality in the sense that the former focuses on inputs required for the government to be able to produce and implement robust policies whereas the later captures these policies itself. 'Government effectiveness' measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. In other words, it captures the efficient functioning of the government machinery.
The third most important institutional concept is political stability. It actually captures political instability arising from conflict via armed conflict, social unrest, politically motivated violence or terrorist threats. Large-scale conflict in the contemporary world mainly takes the form of internal wars in developing countries.
There have been over forty civil war episodes since the end of the cold war. These conflicts are a major cause of development failure, contributing to the persistence of poverty.
Political stability is followed by rule of law and control for corruption. 'Rule of Law' measures respect for societal rules, confidence in the supremacy of law and captures the public perception of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. In short it accounts for the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions. On the other hand 'control for corruption' measures corruption within the legal, financial or economic system, which distorts the competitive environment, and reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to abuse positions of power through bribes, patronage and nepotism.
'Voice and accountability', corresponding to democracy, is the institutional proxy which matters least. It captures various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political right and measures the transparency of political, commercial and legal institutions. The view of Barro (1996) is that democracy can positively affect growth when personal and political freedoms are very weak, but lowers growth when some liberties are already in place. This suggests a quadratic relationship between democracy and growth, it is first positive and then negative. Voice and accountability may matter less when government effectiveness, regulatory capacity and the rule of law are well established and function well. But democracy may be of greater importance when these other factors are weak.
In contrast to our results for specification 3 apropos institutional superiority over trade, specifications 1 and 2 which include human capital, tell a different story which brings us back to the work of Rodrik el al. (2004) . However, they did not take into account human capital in their log of per capita income equations and thus their analysis may have misspecification biases as can be seen from the very low One reason for getting insignificant values for institutions in specification 1 and 2 could be because human capital influences economic development by improving the working of institutions, as suggested by Lipset (1960) and recently reemphasised in Glaeser et al. (2004a and 2004b) . Our results support this, as we find that human capital is always significant when it enters in equation 1 under specifications 1 and 2, taking over from institutions in explaining differences in per capita income (table 3) .
To investigate possible complementarities between institutions and human capital we would like to further investigate the inter-relationship between human capital formation and institutional quality. To this effect we modify our explanatory equation for per-capita income determination in equation (1), by including an interaction term, where we interact human capital with six available concepts of institutional quality. The object is to determine the impact of human capital on institutional development, while at the same time accounting for and solving the endogeneity problems in institutions and human capital. An important observation from table 6 is that interaction terms overwhelmingly carry positive signs. This means that institutions and human capital are complements and any improvement in human capital will promote institutional quality of the country and vice versa. Here, we can say that human capital is as important in explaining per-capita and growth differentials as institutions. This is in line with the findings of Glaeser et al. (2004a) who concluded their study with following remarks: "the existing research cannot convincingly show that institutions rather than human capital have a causal effect on economic growth (p. 41)".
In that respect we have somewhat addressed the 'institutional dilemma' mentioned in Rodrik et al. (2004) as we find that human capital and institutions are complements.
4 Thus, if institutional improvement is at the fore of the policy makers' priority list, investment in education is a pre-requisite for meeting goals on institutional front.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Do institutions dominate international economic integration in explaining differences in per-capita income across countries? Clearly, the importance of institutions in determining the economic development of a country cannot be overemphasised. Institutions, whether the rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, control of corruption or government effectiveness, are all pre-requisites for development and are the catalyst for the success of any development strategy. But the fact remains that institutions or institutional development is a long term phenomenon, and is not an objective policy concept for short term economic strategies to achieve higher economic growth. That is why even after finding institutions rule over integration, Rodrik et al. (2004) conclude their paper with following lines: "How much guidance do our results provide to policy makers who want to improve the performance of their economies? Not much at all.
Sure, it is helpful to know that geography is not destiny, or that focusing on increasing 4 Institutional superiority fails to have any operational value for policy makers. the economy's links with world markets is unlikely to yield convergence. But the operational guidance that our central result on the primacy of institutional quality yields is extremely meagre."
Mere institutional superiority has no practical application for policy makers in the short run. Since institutions cannot be modified in a short span of time, they may be beyond the scope of a lot of policy making. So where do we stand? How can we make the importance of institutions more relevant for policy makers by unlocking this 'institutional dilemma'? To this effect we have tried to find a close substitute for institutions which would also responds to the short term policy time framework.
According to Glaeser et al. (2004a) the existing research cannot convincingly show that institutions rather than human capital have a causal effect on economic growth.
They provide evidence to suggest that it is human capital which also contributes to institutional development and not the other way around. "Ëducation is needed for courts to operate and to empower citizens to engage with government institutions.
Literacy encourages the spread of knowledge about government malfeasance. Social connections make it possible to form private groups, which then take on the task of challenging the state. According to this view, countries differ ultimately in their stocks of human and social capital, and the institutional outcomes depend on this endowment (Ibid, 2004:19) ." An important message one can extract from their paper is that human capital can be a close substitute for institutions, as human capital and institutions tend to move together: "All or nearly all high human capital countries are stable democracies. All or nearly all low human capital countries are dictatorships, with virtually no checks and balances (ibid, 2004a: 41) ."
To summarise, we find that opening up domestic markets to foreign competition by revoking trade restrictions and trade barriers can be good for economic performance. Secondly, developing human capital is as important as superior institutional functioning for economic wellbeing. Indeed, the accumulation of human capital stocks via increased education might lead to improved institutional functioning, and the utilisation of policies like trade liberalisation. The evidence regarding the importance of human capital is clear cut in the growth literature. Indeed any country which is currently developed, or any country on the verge of development, has first seen significant improvements in human capital. Policies aimed at educational improvement yield a double dividend: they improve institutions in the longer-run and in the shorter-run they will allow for greater gains to the economy from trade liberalisation. Eventually, superior institutional functioning will lead to greater home-grown (endogenous) democracy and make absolute poverty unacceptable.
With regard to the role of international integration versus institutions we have found that openness counts for little per se in explaining income differences across countries. This is because it is an outcome and not a cause. Trade policies, and liberalisation, on the other hand, are not insignificant in explaining cross-country percapita income variation. With regard to trade policies we can safely say that the overall policy stance, particularly those associated with black market premia in foreign exchange markets and export taxes, are most important. The presence of these two phenomena is also closely related to poor institutional performance. Tariffs and quotas on imports, however, are of secondary importance, indicating that they are less growth retarding. -t-Values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. -Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993 ).
-ª Please also refer to table 6, where we give results for equation 5. There also Txtrdg is the most significant variable out of the three selected openness and trade policy variables (i.e., Lcopen, tariffs and Txtrdg). Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) Depends as it is a common instrument
